Principles: what you hold to while it runs

Supports Authorship

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  Psychological ownership

  What it established. People come to feel that something is theirs through three routes — controlling it, coming to know it intimately, and investing themselves in it — and that feeling changes how responsibly they treat it.

  What it licenses here. Why authorship is a principle rather than a legal question about credit. All three routes run through the parts of the work AI most readily absorbs, which predicts that ownership weakens quietly as delegation grows unless it is deliberately held.

  Pierce, J. L., Kostova, T., & Dirks, K. T. (2003). The state of psychological ownership: Integrating and extending a century of research. Review of General Psychology, 7(1), 84–107. Source

Supports Productive Friction

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  Desirable difficulties

  What it established. Practice conditions that slow acquisition and feel worse at the time often produce better long-term retention and transfer than conditions that make performance smooth immediately.

  What it licenses here. The principle's whole content: not all friction is waste, and removing it is a choice with a cost that shows up later. It does not license treating friction as good in itself — the finding is about specific manipulations, and an obstacle that teaches nothing is just an obstacle.

  Schmidt, R. A., & Bjork, R. A. (1992). New conceptualizations of practice: Common principles in three paradigms suggest new concepts for training. Psychological Science, 3(4), 207–218. Source

Supports Calibrated Trust

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  Trust as appropriate reliance

  What it established. The goal is not more trust or less trust in an automated system but trust matched to its actual reliability. Both over-reliance and under-reliance are failures, and each has its own costs.

  What it licenses here. Why the model refuses to treat reliance as a deficit or independence as a virtue. Calibration is the target, and it is the reason Verification is a mode rather than a personality trait.

  Lee, J. D., & See, K. A. (2004). Trust in automation: Designing for appropriate reliance. Human Factors, 46(1), 50–80. Source

Supports Dialogue, not Transaction

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  Initiative belongs to both parties

  What it established. Useful systems are not vending machines. Either party can take the initiative, and the interaction is a negotiated sequence rather than a request and a response.

  What it licenses here. Why the single-shot prompt is treated as a missed opportunity rather than merely an inefficient one: the part of the exchange where the person's own question gets reshaped only exists across turns.

  Horvitz, E. (1999). Principles of mixed-initiative user interfaces. Proceedings of CHI '99, 159–166. Source

Supports Voice Preservation

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  Writing as a process with a writer in it

  What it established. Writing is not transcription of finished thought. It is a recursive process of planning, translating and reviewing in which goals are discovered and revised while writing, not before it.

  What it licenses here. Why voice is a principle and not a stylistic preference. If goals are formed during composition, then handing composition over hands over some of the goal-setting too — the loss is not decorative. It does not license the claim that AI-assisted writing always costs voice; it identifies where the cost would occur.

  Flower, L., & Hayes, J. R. (1981). A cognitive process theory of writing. College Composition and Communication, 32(4), 365–387. Source

Supports Reflection

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  Metacognitive monitoring

  What it established. People can monitor and regulate their own cognition, and this capacity develops, can be taught, and is frequently poor when left to itself.

  What it licenses here. The principle that compounds the others: examining your own engagement as a site of learning is what turns any of the five above into something durable. Together with Schön it is the mechanism behind the Becoming loop.

  Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry. American Psychologist, 34(10), 906–911. Source